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On Historical Research in Social Sciences 
By Yuzo Deguchi 
I 
What signiffcance does the historical research have to social 
sciences? 
Two methods would be possible in any consideration of the rela-
tions between social sciences and history. One method would inquire 
into the significance of the historical study in the specific sciences 
belonging to the category of social sciences, while the other would 
probe into what behavior the student of historical science should show 
in relation to the cognition as entertained by social sciences. In other 
words, the former method presupposes history as seen from the angle 
of social sciences, while the latter would try to determine the attitude 
toward the cognition of social sciences as seen from the angle of 
history. These two methods are naturally born of the fact that there 
is, in Japanese universities, a distinct line of separation between the 
study of social sciences and science of history. And as far as the 
present situation in Japan is concerned, the historical research by the 
latter method apparently is more in vogue. In the history of culture as 
well as the history of the economics and politics, remarkable results 
have been achieved by the process of take up and elaborate upon the 
fruits of study in social sciences. And we must remember that this 
process is not the one which had been taken in the past on the basis 
of a rough application of the materialistic conception of history with 
no substantiating fact supporting it, but the one which, penetrating 
into the domain of study at issue, draws the categories of social 
sciences out of the subject-matter, and, thus acquiring a foothold 
on which to support the assertion by allocating a proper place for 
the theory of historical materialism, proceed to observe and organise 
the facts relevant to the problem at issue. Inasmuch as such process 
is pursued from the viewpoint of the actual problem which requires 
to be solved, the researcher himself is spurred on by the feeling that 
be is discharging his own practical mission for the country, and this 
impression is liable to be shared by the readers of his research. 
There is a doubt, on the other hand, about the achievement the 
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first method has succeeded in yielding. Take the economics, for 
instance. In economic history and history of the economic theory, we 
receive the impression that few attempts have been made for an 
exposition, based on a clearcut recognition of the scientific nature of 
the economics, of the relation between the specific historical research 
and the cognition itself of the economic theory, or, the relation 
between the historical research and the studies of theory and policy. 
To be more precise, it would be possible to assert that the recent 
trends in general practice in the historical study of the economic are 
presup posing a general understanding or a tacit concurrence of theory 
aad policy, to conduct a historical research of such cognition. 
As a consequence, the following situation is to be observed in 
the circles of the economic study. While, on the one hand, among 
those who concur in the presuppositions of the historical study, it is 
generally considered that the extent, to which the results of such 
historical study coincide vividly with the theory of economics, or 
the power to justify the political stand presupposed in such study, 
determines the intrinsic value of the study; But, on the other hand, 
among those who reject the theoretical and political presupposition, 
the study is thought to be nothing better than a self·styled dogmatism, 
unworthy of any serious consideration. Although it is admissible 
that the existence of "two economics ", as well as that of the "two 
worlds" pOints to the extraordinary situation which confronts the 
world today, inasmuch as in scientific research there is a stronger 
demand for objectivity than in the politics, it should be conceded that 
such appraisal of the historical research contains much to be seriously 
reflected upon. As soon as we begin to think that the results of 
historical study can take any shape depending on the fundamental 
standpoint the study happens to take, the study of history is inevi· 
tably reduced to a secondary position in relation to the study of theory 
or to the exposition of pOlicies. And then, it becomes void of any 
meaning that the historical truth is to face the theory or policy with 
its own inherent authority and that it ought to be equipped with the 
authority to determine the worth of the theory and the propriety 
of any specific policy. If this should happen, it will naturally follow 
that historical research fails to be appraised, rightly, and, further, 
unduly made light of, by the social scientists. 
The second tendency which is to be expected from the foregoing, 
. is as follows. While conceding that the historical research should be 
conducted based on the respective political or practical standpoint of 
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the researcher, too much emphasis. on this particular point would 
inevitably result in the historical study to. be made little of, and, 
therefore, it would be considered to be more to the purpose in the 
hiscal study, without placing undue emphasis. on the practical stand-
point, to tackle the historical fact without any prejudices in an effort 
to gain factual evidences. This attitude, it is acknowledged, would 
be subject to some extent of criticisms; however, it would be anyway 
capable of bequeathing something tangible to posterity. To bequeath 
something tangible to posterity would be considered to be far better 
than to waste time and energy in abstract discussions of the standpoint 
to be employed. There, of course, exists the difficulty of what method 
to be employed as far as the historical study of social sciences is 
concerned. But, by tracing the data faithfully and without bias, this 
particular branch of study will by degrees be built up into a concrete 
substance. It is felt that, keeping pace with the general trend toward 
the pre-war nationalistic pattern of thinking in to-day's Japan, such 
attitude relative to historical study in social sciences has apparently 
come up to the fore as a wing in these sciences. This should be 
called and criticised strictly as the tendency to reversion of Japan in 
the field of social sciences. 
Thus, we find that, in comparison with the way of reflection from 
the science of history to social sciences, the way from social sciences 
to history, is still void of any meritorious achievement. 
II 
A reflection on this situation will unavoidably lead one to th basic 
problem of what method is to employ in the social sciences. Although 
the methods employed in science in general follow two processes of 
both attaining abstractum from concretum and vice versa, it 'should he 
noted that the way of reflection that leads to history from social 
sciences differs in some respect from the inverse way of reflection. 
To hasten to the conclusion: the way of reflection from history to social 
sciences apparently is eligible for being handled scientifically more ea.~ily 
compared with the other 1Vays of reflection in the opposite direction. 
This conclusion will be understood from the following explanation. 
The study of historical science finds its starting point in the substan-
tial interest in reality on the part of the researcher, a fact which 
needs no reiteration, and the interest is highly vivid and subjective 
in the researcher himself. The researcher, equipped with such positive 
interest and concern, boldly faces. the factual historical reality. 
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While directing his interest simultaneously to social sciences, he tries 
to reach abstract categories of the social sciences from these facts. 
Supported by the social scientific truth, the thought acquires the found-
ation for being true, and, while re-producing in consciousness the 
original historical facts, it re-converges on them and succeeds in .re-
producing another historical fact, next in order, as the historical 
knowledge. It in itself is embodied with a substantiaJ content, and 
thus the objective of the historical cognition will have been attained. 
Thus, it will be seen, in the way of reflection from history to social 
sciences, that the principle of epistemology that concretum leads to 
abstractum and vice versa can be applied without any. modification. 
However, the inverse way of reflection, that is, reflection frorp social 
sciences to history will demand more methodological operations. 
While the starting point of the study of social sciences, needless to 
say, is likewise a practical interest of the researcher, it should be 
necessary that the object of study be limited abstractively as an econo-
mic phenomenon, and, further, a definite answer should be given to 
the inevitability of such a phenomenon existing as a historical reality; 
The ontological ground for research, in the final analysis, should be 
the common ground of social sciences and history and the point on 
which both stand. Once such ground and starting point is acquired; 
such a sabject-matter will have been proved as a definite historical 
fact. However, the determination of this historical fact alone does 
never mean the end of the mission borne by the historical researcher 
of the economic science. He is further required to explain this fact 
in relation to the theory of the economics .. Unless 'the fact is ex-
plained in the light of the category of the economics, the work will 
hardly worth being considered a research into either economic history 
or history of the economic thought. However, another problem comes 
UP to the fore, here. If it is required that a historical fact, after 
being established as a historical reality, should be explained in the 
light of the categories of are economics, this fact, after being grasped 
as a concrete reality, will apparently have to pass through another 
process of abstractivisation, for the categories of economics,in a 
word, are nothing but attributes of a specific generalised fact. seep 
under a given premise. This process of abstractivisation which a 
historical fact is required to undergo before being grasped with any 
concreteness, is unavoidable in the consideration of history from the 
standpoint of social sciences. 
Therefore, when a researcher of history produces a certain positive 
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and practical proposition to reality from his social scientific conclusion 
as long as he conducts his study from a practical standpoint, it is 
inevitable that he should produce a positive and practical proposition 
-he will be required to become conscious of the abstraction which lies 
in the essence of this conclusion (which lies in the essence of the branch of 
social sciences that he studies), and be aware of the method by which he 
is enabled, extricating himself from this abstraction, to make a con-
crete and positive statement in the face of reality. If not, it may 
happen that he hastens to force an abstract scientific proposition on 
reality (one example is the mechanical application of the materialistic concep-
tion of history), or by forcing a practical passion on an abstract. pro-
position, deceives himself as if he were making a concerete statement 
on reality (one example of this is found in the case in Which he one-sidedly 
stresses an abstract conclusion and loses sight of the entity of the problem, 
although this attitude, in itself, is not to be labelled as a mistake). The 
accusation that such propensity in thinking is expected in the 
researcher of economics originates, in the lack on his part of the 
awareness of the method as described in the preceding lines. 
The accusation that the study of history from the standpoint of 
social sciences lacks tangible achievement in comparison with the 
study of social sciences from the standpoint of history is based on 
the difficulty experienced by the student in taking full cognition of 
the abstraction inherent in the conclusion of social science and re-
placing it with a concrete and effective statement. This state of 
things was directly allued to by the present writer when he, in the 
preceding lines, declared that a basic problem of what method to 
employ would unavoidably be confronted. 
III 
This basic problem of method arises from the scientific character-
istics of social sciences. In order, therefore, to solve this problem, it 
would naturally be necessary to allude to the position social sciences 
should occupy in the theory of sciences. 
Confining the issue to the economics, the scientific properties of 
economics were first begun to be considered in comparison with 
natural sciences only when the classic economics entered the stage 
where it began to play the role of apologetics and in this case the 
philosophy of positivism was adopted. In this sense, what J. S. Mill 
achieved concerning the position of political economy in the moral 
and political sciences was of vast significance. However, the classic 
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economics which Mill tried to defend, or rather the naturalistic econo-
mics, were never to be considered to have been based on a way of 
thinking peculiar to social sciences, because its fundamental standpoint 
was to consider a social being on the model of a natural being, and the 
characteristic feature of this particular standponint was to consider 
that nature and society as welI as nature and history are consecutively 
co-related to each other. 
It was on the standpoint of placing emphasis on history that the 
economics were considered to be of different structure compared with 
natural sciences. And here, needless to say, the pivot of this struc-
ture was to be found in the historical properties of the object at 
issue. With the rise of the Historical School in Germany, study of 
economics in its scientific method was undertaken, and, either from 
the standpoint af positivism or from that of the Neo-Kantianism, 
scrutiny of the special properties of social sciences, considered under 
the name of spiritual sciences, cultural sciences or historical sciences, 
as sciences of a different category from natural sciences, was made. 
EspeCially in Japan, the Baden School of Nen-Kantianism was widely 
adopted in the decade of 1920. However, it should be recalled that, 
prior to this, various attempts in this direction, had been made in 
Western countries. 
To lead the trend, Helmholz stood for spiritual science as oppos-
ing natural science, while Lotze drew a line between natural science 
and historical science. However, the economists of the Historical 
School were not satisfied with this method of distinguishing between 
these two kinds of science, and, among them it was Karl Knies who 
tried seriously to substantiate his own position from the standpoint 
of method to be employed. He follows tbe pattern of Helmholz's 
thinking and tries to think of science in terms of the distinction 
between nature and spirit as far as their respective object is con-
cerned. In the course of his study, he look notice of the existence of 
a third science, which belong to neither of these. According to him, 
while natural science has for its object the exterior world which 
can be felt sensuously and spiritual science deals with the interior 
spiritual phenomena of man, there exists a group of objects which 
belong to neither of these two and this is precisely that category 
of science in the center of which stands economics. This group of 
objects refers to "man's conduct and doings" and "the various situa-
tions of life community, arising on the basis of man's conduct or 
doings, which have been made orderly and legalised." Although 
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they are such phenomena that can be felt sensuously, their meaning 
are clarified only when inquiry is made into the co-relation between 
these phenonena and man's spiritual life_ Naming this particular 
category of science "Staats-und-gesellschafts-wissenschaften", Knies 
proposed that it be placed in a third category (K Knies, Die Politische 
Oekonomie Yom Geschichtlichen Standpunkte, 1883). This attitude, peculiar 
to Historical School, which tries to classify sciences according to the 
characteristics of the subjecter matter, however, should be called 
abstract as far as it remains in this stage, and as such, is open to 
criticism_ However, it should be conceded to have been a method 
more to the crux of the issue, if compared with such idealistic method 
in which attempt was made to classify sciences only in terms of the 
difference existing in the various methods employed, a tendency which 
came to the fore in later years_ 
It should be noted, however, that the Neo-Kantian school color-
ing, which became the leading tone of the later theories of science, 
served to sweep Knies' third science theory off his footing_ In the 
scientific theory followed by the Baden School, the intention to make 
more distinctive the characteristics, respectively, of natural science 
and another science which is distinguished from it in terms of the 
method employed, ended in overshadowing the entity of science, and 
failed to dictate an independent method to social sciences and, even-
tually, had to be contented with giving such a vague nomenclature 
as an "intermediary domain_" It would be unnecessary to reiterate 
here that Max Weber, by endeavoring to work out a peculiar theory 
of method for this "intermediary domain", has succeeded in achieving 
his remarkable results_ 
In Dilthey, who, while fundamentally differing from Helmholz in 
the theory of method employed, followed him as far as the method of 
classification was concerned, by virtue of the • fact of life", which 
was already discernible in Knies, and made a substantial contribution 
to the epistemology of the spiritual science comparable in its im-
portance with what the Baden School did, social sciences failed to be 
indicated as a science in the third category, with cultural sciences and 
social sciences being designated as subdivision of spiritual science. 
He divided spiritual science into science of Kultursystem (system of cul-
ture) and that of iiussere Organization cler Gesellschaft (external organi-
zation of society) (Cf. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883)_ 
Of course, Dilthey conceded that the objects of these two sciences, 
respectively, were closely inter-related in actual reality. However, 
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as the domains of objects of science, they had to be such as can be 
distinctly divided. If this theory of science is applied to economics, 
it would be impossible to gain a comprehensive perspective of the 
issue involved in science. The economic life, while, it is in one respect, 
a system of culture aimed at the accumulation and pursuit of wealth, 
is, at the same time, as far as its concrete being is concerned, a 
national economy which more or less is subjected to control exercised 
by the national will, and the assertion that it is important to grasp 
it in its realistic form, was commonly shared by those belonging to 
the Historical School. If it is so, it naturally follows that the econo-
mic science, while being a science of Kultursystem, on the one hand, 
is, on the other, a science of iiussere Organization der Gesel(schaft 
controlling the Kultursyslem. Dilthey asserts that the world of laws 
constitutes the point of contact between Kultursystem and iiussere 
Organization. Therefore, the economic life as seen under these two 
sciences, is bridged over by "laws ", and probably is considered 
to become a unified world of subjects-matter. 
Such epistemological specification of economics is nothing less 
than a frank and explicit manifestation of the standpoint adopted by 
Historical School. That is to say, economics in so far as it is a 
science of Kultursystem had been severely criticised as abstract school, 
and, in so far as economic Kultursystem exists under the guise of 
iiussere Organization, special scope of study is considered to be able 
of being established, inasmuch as co-working of non-economic factors 
can duly be taken into consideration. To think that laws play the 
role of a bridge between these two is an undisguised manifestation 
of a petit-bourgeois bureaucratic standpoint taken by the teachers of 
Historical School. Thus, when, for instance, a study of history is 
made from the standpoint of Historical School, there naturally would 
follow that the study be tinged with a propensity of placing emphasis 
on the history of jurisprudence, and then, it would be no wonder that 
the issue was taken up in relation to the ideology as was entertained 
by the ruling class of 19th century Germany. The conclusion is that, 
even from the standpoint as was taken by Dilthey, the necessity of 
crowning social sciences with the nomenclature of a third category, 
which had been foreshadowed by Knies, was eventually to disappear 
from the epistemology. 
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IV 
The intention to include the social sciences in the third category 
was also discernible in the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida, the well-
known philosopher in Japan. He thought that social sciences were, 
after all, not to be considered as something taking its place between 
natural science and history, but was something equipped with pecu-
liarly characteristic features, and, he gave the sciences a name of 
science of type. The fact that this kind of science was to be given a 
specification from the nature of its world of objects, which he calls, 
.. something which is seen from the fact that we are living in this 
world of reality", amply shows that the Nishida's philosophy is some-
time above such as places the first emphasis on the method employed. 
However, even here it is not shown how to enter into the domain 
of economics and undertake further reflection on its scientific theory. 
It is, in a word, a theory forced metaphysically, which we can never 
find satisfactory, but find endowed with a number of reasons for 
resentment. To illustrate this, the following extract may be quoted 
from Nishida's writing: 
.. All sciences which are considered to be cultural sciences would 
be able to be considered a science of type, this applying to so-called 
social sciences and economics as well as the sciences of art and of 
morals. Especially among them, economics deal with a world of 
materialistic desires, and, as such, would be considered nearer to 
natural science. However, as far as its object itself and its method 
are concerned, it should be considered to be of a pattern different 
from natural science." ("The World as a Dialectical Being in General," The 
Collected Works of Kitaro Nishida, Vol. 7, pp. 402, 403) 
Even in a treatise written five years afterwards, be failed to show 
any progress in his theory on social sciences, but, on the contrary, 
the impression would be unavoidable that he had even retrogressed: 
.. The world of social sciences could only be considered when the 
poiesis-ego or man is placed in the world. Our poiesis is, self-contra-
dictorily, nothing but the world's self-formation and from here is 
formed the poiesis-ego. The laws of self-formation of such contradic-
orily self-identificational world, should become the laws of social 
sciences, and, therefore, it would be able to be considered, at the 
same time, as historical sciences, too." (" The Empirical Science," The 
Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 287). 
The reaSOn why we made the statement that Nishida's philosophy 
is open to the accusation that it has retrogressed, is that, whereas 
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formerly social sciences were thought of as equipped with different 
essentials compared with either natural science or the science of 
history, the distance at which it is placed from the science of history 
in his thought of the later days, has become rather vague and 
undefined. 
Thus, we must say that all the attempts hitherto made in an 
endeavor to place social sciences in the third category in the clas-
sification of science, have so far resulted in a failure. Further, in the 
attempt to define a science which stands diametrically opposed to 
natural science, opinion differs widely, some taking up the science of 
history, while ethers choosing the name of cultural science. Therefore, 
it would only be a natural result that the significance of the historical 
study in social sciences can be interpreted in various ways. 
v 
The present writer, for himself, is of the opInion that here it 
would be absolutely necessary to define accurately social sciences 
as distinguished either from natural science or from the science 
of culture. Although such attempt can not be easily and simply 
accomplished, progress in this direction might be expected to be 
made gradually from the following angles of observation. 
It would be thought that the main reason why all the attempts 
to specify social sciences as one equipped with special character have 
been ended in failure was that sufficient notice was not taken of the 
social nature of the human existence. The present writer will explain 
this according to the main currents in the development of modern social 
science. The main currents could be called, 1) naturalism in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, and 2) hi8toricism in the 19th century. In the con-
sideration of human existence, naturalism took the position that, under 
the dominance of the conception of continuity, the individual-being should 
be considered basically, which, then, exlends to family, class, and race, 
and, . eventually, to mankind, and, that, by thus unilaterally and 
continually expanding this conception of individuality, all the aspects 
of his social existence could fully be grasped, and, here, needless to say, 
a strikingly large abstraction, both in regard to the historical nature 
and social nature, should he pointed out. As opposing to this stand-
point, the thinking of historicism was that the historical nature 
of human existence should be most emphasized and that the self-con-
sciousness of being a historical man should lie at the root of the study 
of cultural science or social sciences. This emphasis of the historical 
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nature of social sciences has contributed substantially towards the 
progress of the sciences, and, here, for the first time, three separate 
epistemological branches of history, theory and policy were established 
iri social sciences, and it was thought a unification of all these would 
constitute the essence of such scientific cognition. Thus, it was 
gradually established tbat in social sciences, the historical study and 
political study amount to something more than a mere pedantry or a 
pre-scientific curiosity-hunting, and are the subjects which deserve to 
be studied with the same amount· of prestige and authoriLy as the 
study of theory'. These contribution On the part of historicism to 
social sciences should even be borne in memory. 
However, it should be noted that the petit-bourgeois nature of 
the historical school, bewildered by its emphasis of Lhe historical 
nature of human existence, committed the same blunder, as did 
naturalism, with regard to the social nature of human existence. It 
is there treated as though there existed no class in the actual 
society. For instance, the fact that man~s social existence has a 
class formation and is unified by virtue of the threat of disintegration 
inherent in it _. we can see it in enterprise, public organisation, or, 
nation - was lost sight of, and it was thought that the individual 
being was expanded into a social sphere, and, when this was organ-
ically unified, the result was the formation of the family and the race. 
This is the theory of organism peculiar to the historicism. And, 
this organism in itself was thought to make no historical movement, 
ever trying to preserve its own identity. The theory of social 
organism is not the theory formulated on the facts of Man's 
social existence itself, but is a theory formulated on the modele of 
the existence, whether it be a physiological theory of organism, or 
whether it be a transcendental or metaphysical theory of organism. 
Therefore,if the foundation of this pattern of thinking is sought in 
man's existence itself, it must be inevitably reduced to the same 
pattern as in naturalism, namely, the individual being. In other 
words, the standpoint taken by historicism leads us to the conclusion 
that the consciousness as a historical being has been materialised in 
an individual being in social existence. 
The ideas of all· such researchers, which. have so far. been taken 
up as the theOries of science, have nOt, it should be noted, stepped 
out of the standpoint of individual being essentially interpreted in 
this meaning. Even in case the race is considered as the subject, the 
actual aspect of the social existence implying the class division and 
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the unification on its basis was not discerned, and, thus, it means 
nothing but the individual as opposing the whole in the sense as is 
interpreted by the theroy of organism, and, therefore, it should be 
said that it in itself does never deviate from the standpoint of the 
individual. 
The cardinal point invoived in the tr'ue interpretation of social 
existence lies in shifting the historicai self-consciousness of an individual to 
that of a social man. This is possible only on the standpoint of so-
cialism, and never on that either of the naturalistic or historical 
standpoint. This is because the socialistic standpoint accepts the 
society as the subject, and views the individual as its constituent 
factor of this subject, and a working factor to modify its organisation 
historically, and, from this standpoint, the historical nature of man's 
existence could be considered not from the non-historical angle 
(for, the standpoint of the indivuidual has been acquired by abstracting 
the historical properties from the modern bourgeoisie's standpoint), 
but, on the contrary, from the dynamic and historical angle, which 
itself is likewise subject to the modifications resulting from 
the historical structure. Both object and subject would be enabled 
to have a thorough self-consiousness of its historical nature only 
on the standpoint in which the society is accepted as the subject. 
This is to say that a thorough self-consciousness of the historical 
nature is possible only in conjunction at the same time with that of 
the social nature of man's existence. The view in which the society 
is accepted as the subject and individual is taken as meaning nothing 
more than a constituent factor which works to change its historical 
struture, in short, means, so far as it occurs in a class society, that 
due notice is taken of the class formation of the society, and that 
man's consciousness is grasped as a class consciousness, and, thus, 
further, that human conduct is considered only in terms of a class 
stuggle. 
While it has been stated that the socialistic standpoint presupposes 
the transplanting of the historical self-consciousness of the individual 
man to that of the social man, there also exists a standpoint, as 
opposing the individualistic standpoint taken in the bourgeois society, 
in which a non-historical self-consciousness takes places in a social 
man. That is the very standpoint taken, in general, by what is under-
stood as the utopian socialism, or, more precisely, the petit-bourgeois 
or romantic socialism. There, because the self-consciousness has 
been non-historical in its nature, mankind in general, freedom in 
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general, and equality in general alone have be emphasised, and thus 
it has been impossible to grasp fully the entity of mankind, freedom 
and equality as existing at a specific historical moment, with the result 
that the idea itself, contrary to the subjective intentions, has una-
voidably been forced to play a reactionary role to the social movement. 
It would be insufficient for the clarification of the entire issue 
involved to state merely that social sciences treat as its object the 
social relations of mankind and various social phenomena arising 
therefrom. It would be more to the point to think that such social 
relations can become the object of social sciences only when they 
are grasped in the course of working to produce changes in its 
structure. This, in its turn, would tend to give the impression that 
the significance of the individual in relation to society and history 
is unduly minimized. True, there exists a domain of life where the 
significance of the individual personality commands an imposing value. 
Even in a socialistic society it would be sufficienty possible that the 
individual as such retains his own independent meaning. It should 
be noted, however, that it occurs only in the domain of the cultural 
life, which is taken up as the object of the cultural science, and can 
never be seen in the domain treated particularly by social sciences. 
Thus, may it not be said with safety that the characteristics of 
social sciences exist in accepting as its subject matter special aspects 
of these social relations of social life? (It would be needless to remind 
that cultural life likewise is closely related to such domain of life where the 
society is the subject. Especially, the economic life is one with which it is 
most closely related. Thus, it follows that the economic science is numbered 
among the social sciences). 
VI 
If it is established that the special characteristics of the subject 
matter to be taken up by social sciences can safely be interpreted as 
described in the foregoing lines, then it would follow that the mean-
ing of the historical studies in social sciences can fully be grasped. 
And, this meaning would be twofold: first, in relation to the object 
of research and, secondly, in relation to the researcher himself. 
As for the object of research in social sciences is concerned, 
the meaning of its historical study would be as follows: while, gener-
ally speaking, the objective of the historical study lies in the under-
standing of the historical individuality, that is to say, the only·one-
time·ness, the individuality or only-one-time·uess in social sciences, 
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should not be taken in their respective strict sense of the term. On 
the contrary, here the individual phenomenon as an example of the 
" pattern" ~the meaning of which we have had no liberty to clarify 
in this short treatise- is made an issue, and to the researcher of 
social sciences, what really matters is the group of individual phe-
nonema belonging to the same pattern. No historical phenomenon, 
unless it is massive in quantity, would be sufficient in itself to draw 
the intrinsic interest of a researcher of social sciences. For instance, 
the new religious movement initiated by Martin Luther and his 
attitude toward the Agraian War would well become the object of 
detailed research, but, the real aspects in detail of these entire 
movements would not draw the researcher's attention; on the contrary, 
his task would have been accomplished if he could succeed to clarify, on 
the basis of these real aspects involved, the part Luther played from the 
point of view of the class struggle. For the researcher of social 
sciences it would be enough to enunciate what result Luther's attitude 
brought about, within the confines of the category of the economic 
science, to such cry for liberation raised by peasants in the feudalistic 
caste society. In this sense, it could be said that the historical study 
would serve to give the possibility of various categories of the 
economics to approach to historical actuality. In other words, the his-
torical study makes it possible to analyse historical economic existence 
by theoretical categories, and, at the same time, to the contrary, to 
file theoretical categories into a historical stage. In the economic 
science, all the tools of idea have their respective corresponding 
objective being in the historical actuality, and such theoretical 
categories as can be certified through the historical study will be 
unable to realise a proximity to actuality, and, therefore, the theory 
that is formed on the basis of such categories must be rather harmful 
than useful to social sciences. 
The historical study of social sciences, as far as it is related to 
the researcher himself, is burdened with the following implications. 
In the social sciences, where society is accepted as its subject matter 
and where the individual, its constituent factor, works to change it 
historically, the class which works in the world of object and the 
individuals who compose it, while having different time and locality 
in comparison with the subject matter of the study, takes a definite 
stand of being either its ally or foe, in the place of the class struggle, 
as far as its relation to the subject of the study is concerned. When 
facing the historical object, the actual passion of the researcher, so 
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to speak, is stirred up. And, thus, it would be that its own practical 
ego is established as one burdened with a historical background. 
This is to say that through his historical study the path will be 
opened to him which might lead to his own class self-consciousness. 
This, in its turn, will serve to offer a guiding principle for practice. 
Thus, it would be asserted with safety that for the progress of social 
sciences historical study as would fail to stir up, whether positively 
or passively, the practical passion on the part of the researcher, 
would be rather harmful than useful in every sense. 
